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However, in view of the increasing frequency with which the problem of
excessive and inadequate awards of damages confronts the courts, it can fairly be
considered one of policy and expediency rather than one solely of right. Greater
control over juries is often a practical necessity, which is denied satisfaction by a
static conception of the right to trial by jury. Since expediency of remedy may
often take priority over conservative constitutionality of remedy, in the minds of
litigants, a solution to this problem should be a matter of some concern. In this
light,
Seemingly, if the jury system is to be retained, it would be a practically
desirable modification to confer upon trial and appellate courts the power to
correct directly awards of damages. However, assuming the wisdom of the
modification, if properly administered, further court or legislative action is unlikely
in the light of current authorities. General recognition of the power claimed by
Pennsylvania's court of last resort cannot now be forecast.
THOMAS WOOD, JR.

STATEMENTS OF AN AGENT AS EVIDENCE AGAINST
HIS PRINCIPAL IN PENNSYLVANIA
It is a general rule that declarations of an agent made by him in connection
with his employment are admissible against his principal. 1 The reason for allowing such statements to be introduced into evidence is pointed out in Baltimore and
Ohio Relief Association v. Post,2 where the court said through Paxson, J.,
"What an agent says in the course of his employment, and within
his authority, is evidence against his employer, because it thus becomes the act of the principal. Thus, if A is the agent of B to make
a contract for the latter, what A says in regard to the contract at the
time it is being made is part of the contract: it is the equivalent of
the sayings or acknowledgments of the principal. They may be
explanatory of the agreement, or [may] determine the quality of
the act which they accompany, and therefore must be binding on the
principal as the act or agreement itself. The declarations or admissions of an agent in such cases are admissible, not for the purpose
of 'establishing the truth of the facts stated but as representations by
which the principal is bound as if he made them himself, and which
are equally binding whether the fact be true or false."
1HENRY, PENNSYLVANIA TRIAL EVIDENCE (3rd ed. 1939) sec. 76.
2122 Pa. 579, 15 At. 885 (1888).
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The statements of the agent are admissible whether they be spoken or written.
In order to admit the declarations of one person as evidence against another
as his principal it is necessary that several requirements be met. First, the one
making the statement must be, in fact, the agent of the one against whom they
are to be admitted, and this fact of agency must be proved before the statements
can be considered as evidence against the alleged principal. 4 This can be done
in any one of several ways. It may be shown by a contract of agency,5 by circumstances showing an implied agency by a course of dealing on the part of the agent
in a particular capacity, and recognition of these acts by the principal, 6 by declarations of the principal, 7 by the testimony of the agent (but not by his declarations) ,8
or by showing that an agent of limited powers has been in the habit of exercising
greater powers with the knowledge of his principal. 9
It must also be shown that the agent had some authority to make the stateIn Haspel v. Mcment. 10 In some situations apparent authority is sufficient."
Laughlin-Lyonsl2 the secretary of a building association made a remark to a
member of the association to the effect that the member would not have to make
any more payments. Subsequently, in an action to compel the member to pay an
assessment against her shares, the statement by the secretary was not admitted
against the association, for it did not appear that the secretary had any authority
to make the statement. A third requirement is that the statements must be made
in connection with the agency.' 3
In addition one of the following facts must be shown before the statement
can be admitted against his principal.

"It must appear that the agent was specifically authorized to make
them; or his powers must have been such as to constitute him the
general representative of the principal, having the management of
the entire business; or the admissions must have formed part of the
3

Reinenman v. Blair, 96 Pa. 155 (1880) ; Chorpenning v. Royce, 58 Pa. 474 (1868).
Baltimore and Ohio Employees' Relief Association v. Post, 122 Pa. 579, 15 At!. 885 (1888);
Grim v. Bonnell, 78 Pa. 152 (1875); Jordan v. Stewart, 23 Pa. 244 (1854).
5
Dolbs, Exr., v.Zink et ux., 290 Pa. 243, 138 At. 758 (1927).
sIbid.
7Trego v. Huzzard, 19 Pa. 441 (1852).
8Hileman v. Falck, 263 Pa. 351, 106 At. 633 (1919).
9
Dodge v. Williams, 47 Pa. Super. 302 (1911).
10Baltimore and Ohio Employees' Relief Association v. Post, 122 Pa. 579, 15 At. 885 (1888);
Comp v. The Carlisle Deposit Bank, 94 Pa. 409 (1880); Wilt v. Vickers, 8 Watts 227 ('Pa.
1839) ; Haspel v. McLaughlin-Lyons, 38 Pa. Super. 334 (1909) ; Ralph v. Fon Dersmith, 3
Pa. Super. 618 (1897); 20 AM. JUR. 505.
11
These situations are noted later in the text.
1238 Pa. Super. 334 (1909).
l3 Northwestern Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Roth, 87 Pa. 409 (1878); Wilt v. Vickers, 8 Watts
227 (Pa. 1839); 20 AM. JUa. 505.
4
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consideration of a contract; or, if they are non-contractual, they must
have been part of the res gestae.""
It is the primary purpose of this note to analyze this rule and to collect the cases
which indicate how the requirements of the rule are satisfied. The discussion as
to the first of these requirements will be more easily understood if it is taken up
after the third and fourth.
Let us consider, first, then, the rule that statements of an agent can be
admitted against the principal if they form part of the consideration of a contract.
This rule has been followed for a long time in Pennsylvania. It was recognized
and discussed in Hough v. Doyle,15 where Mr. Justice Rogers said,
"When it is proved that one is the agent of another, whatever the
agent does, or says, or writes, in the making of a contract, as agent,
is admissible in evidence against the principal, because it is part of
the contract which he makes for his principal, and which therefore
binds him, but it is not admissible as the agent's account of what
passes. For example, the declaration of a servant, employed to sell
a horse, is evidence to charge the master with warranty, if made at
the time of the sale; if made at any other time, the facts must be
proved by the servant himself. The admissions of an agent, not
mad'e at the time of the transaction, but subsequently, are not evidence. Thus the letters of an agent to his principal, containing a
narrative of the transaction, in which he had been employed are not
admissible in evidence against the principal."
From this it is seen that the agent's declarations must be made by him as agent
and at the time of the making of the contract. However, it is not necessary
that he have actual authority to make the statements; apparent authority is sufficient.' 6 These three facts are all that need to be shown to satisfy this requirement and there is no difficulty in understanding it. Therefore, a collection of
cases would seem unnecessary. However, one case may be noted as an illustration. A railroad company was selling subscriptions to its stock. The subscriptions stated that work on the road would begin as soon as sufficient funds were
acquired. A prospective subscriber asked how much this would be, and a director
of the company told him $150,000. He thereupon subscribed for stock. The
14Milwaukee Loco. Mfg. Co. v. Point Marion C. Co., 294 Pa. 238, 144 Atl. 100 (1928);
Orluske v. Nash Pittsburgh Motors Co., 286 Pa. 170, 133 At. 148 (1926); McGrath v. Penna.
Sugar Co., 282 Pa. 265, 127 Ad, 780 (1925); The Oil City Fuel and Supply Co. v, Boundy, 122
Pa. 449, 15 At!. 865 (1888); Campbell et al. v. G. E. Murphy Co., 122 Pa. Super, 342, 186 At.
269 (1936).
154 Rawle 290 (Pa. 1833).
16Merrick Thread Co. v. Philadelphia Shoe Manufacturing Co., 115 Pa. 314, 8 At!. 794
(1887); Keough v. Leslie, 92 Pa. 424 (1880).
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statement of the director was admitted against the company in a suit to compel
17
the subscriber to pay for the stock before the sum of $150,000 was acquired.
The admissions of declarations of an agent into evidence as part of the res
gestae presents more of a problem. To be admitted the statement must be within
thr scope of the agent's authority, 18 but it is not necessary that he have actual
authority to make it.19 Professor Wigmore maintains that the phrase "res gestae"
should not be used in connection with the admitting of a remark of an agent
against his principal.20 However, the requirements, as laid down by the Pennsylvania Court, as to the facts which must be present in order to admit such
statements as res gestae, are the same as must be met in order to admit any
declaration on this theory,2 1 and therefore there does not seem to be anything
improper about calling such evidence res gestae. The court has not always used
the same language in all the cases in discussing these requirements. In one case
the remarks of the agent were excluded as they were not made "contemporaneous
22
with, and qualifying or explaining the acts in which he was engaged as agent."
In another case in which the agent was involved in an accident, his declarations
were refused as evidence because they were not "so immediately connected with
it [the accident] as necessarily to form a part of its history." 28 In McGrath v.
Penna. Sugar Co. 2 4 the court said,

"It must appear that the statement was spontaneous and reasonably
contemporaneous, though the fact that a short interval of time after
the accident has elapsed does not necessarily render the declaration
inadmissible. . . If the transaction, however, is completed, the
declarations subsequently made,-not part of it,-are objectionable,
. . . and a mere narrative of past events cannot be received, .

.

. nor

expressions of opinion as to the cause or effect of the accident, .
though made immediately after the infliction of the injury."
The substance of these statements is that the declaration of an agent to be admitted as res gestae must be made as a part of a transaction in which he is acting
as agent and must be made either while so acting or immediately thereafter, and
the statement must not be opinion as to the cause or effect of the accident.
Let us now consider some of the cases which have applied this res gestae
theory to statements of an agent. Declaration of a secretary of a school board
with respect to the delivery of goods which the board had ordered and had
l 7 Catey v. Philadelphia and Chester County Railroad, 80 Pa. 363 (1876).

lsMueller's
Estate, 159 Pa. 590, 28 At. 491 (1894).
l0 Lombard & South Street Passenger Railway Company v. Christian, 124 Pa. 114, 16 Atd. 628
(1889); The Oil City Fuel and Supply Co. v. Boundy, 122 Pa. 449, 15 At. 865 (1888).
203 WIGMORE, EvIDENCE (2d ed. 1923) sec. 7769.
21
22 For a good discussion of res gestae see Trickett, Res Gestate (1926) 31 DicK. L. REV. 1.
Fawcett v. Bigley, 59 Pa. 41 (1869).
2

SBigley et al v. Williams, 80 Pa. 107 (1876).

24282

Pa. 265, 127 Atd. 780 (1925).
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directed to be delivered to the secretary were permitted to be introduced against
the board as res gestae. 25 Remarks of a borough street commissioner made while
working on the borough streets were evidence against the borough. 26 A statement by a mayor in a speech at a meeting of the city council was admitted against
the city. 27 In all of these cases the statements were made before the transaction
was completed. But, as has already been noted, a declaration of an agent may be
admitted though a short interval of time has elapsed. Clearly a statement made
after a day or a week has passed cannot be considered part of the res gestae.
There are many cases which recognize this.28 A remark by an agent made after
a lapse of five or six hours was held inadmissible against the principal,29 as was
one made within an hour,2 0 and one about a half-hour,3 1 after an accident occurred. In McGrath v. Penna. Sugar Co. 3 2 the statement of the agent was made
about two minutes after the accident happened. It was excluded because it was
merely an opinion of the agent as to the cause of the accident, and the court did
not discuss at all the nearness in time of the statement to the accident. However, the fact that it was excluded only as being opinion may indicate that the
court felt that it was made soon enough after the accident to be consider'ed part
of the res gestae. The court has never set forth any definite time within which
a declaration of an agent must be made if it is to be res gestae, and it does not
seem that any such time could properly be established. The rule is that the
statement must be part of the event, and whether or not it is such would seem to
depend on the circumstances of each case rather than on the lapse of any arbitrarily established interval of time.
We are now ready to discuss the part of this rule which allows statements
of an agent to be admitted against his principal if the agent was specifically
authorized to make them. The only question presented here is whether the agent
must have actual authority to make the statement or if it is enough if he has
merely apparent authority. The use of the word "specifically" seems to clearly
indicate that there must be actual authority, and the language used by the court
in The Oil City Fuel and Supply Co. v. Boundy s makes it even more certain. It
was there said, "It will be seen that this statement of the agent was not specially
25Sidney School Furniture Co. v. Warsaw School District, 122 Pa. 494, 15 Adt. 881 (1888).
2
6Weir et alv. Plymouth Borough, 148 Pa. 566, 24 Atl. 94 (1892).
27
City of Philadelphia v. Gilmartin, 71 Pa. 140 (1872); The City of Philadelphia v. Collins,
68 Pa. 106 (1871).
2SBrown v. Kittanning Clay Products Company, 259 Pa. 267, 102 Ad. 948 (1918); Matteson
v. New York Central & Hudson River Railroad Co., 218 Pa. 527, 67 Ad. 847 (1907); O'Toole
v. Post Printing and Publishing Co., 179 Pa. 271, 36 Atl. 288 (1897) ; Giberson v. The Patterson
Mills Company, 174 Pa. 369, 34 At. 563 (1896); Huntingdon and Broad Top Mountain R. and
C. Co. v. Decker, 82 Pa. 119 (1876).
29The Oil City Fuel and Supply Co. v. Boundy, 122 Pa. 449, 15 At. 865 (1888).
SOFawcett v. Bigley, 59 Pa. 41 (1869).
SIBigley et al. v. Williams, 80 Pa. 107 (1876).
12282 Pa. 255, 127 At. 780 (1925).
s3122 Pa. 449, 15 Atd. 865 (1988).
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authorized; h was not instructed to go and do the negligent act." It was in
this case that the rule was first promulgated. Surely the court intended that
the agent should have actual authority to make the statement in ordler to meet
this requirement. But there have been several cases since the rule was first set
forth which cast some doubt as to whether actual authority must be shown. In
these cases the agent had only apparent authority and the court did not expressly
say that the statement was res gestae or consideration for a contract, but admitted
the declarations with little or no discussion. However, in all of these cases, with
a possible exception of one, the admission of the remark of the agent into evidence
can be explained as being res gestae or consideration for the contract, although
the court did not expressly say that this was why the statement was admitted. For
example, in Baker v. Westmoreland & Cambria Gas Co.34 a statement made by
the lineman of the company that there was no danger in connecting a certain
pipe 'was admitted in an action against the company to recover damages for injuries resulting from making the connection, although the lineman did not have
actual authority to make the statement. The court said the lineman was acting
within the scope of his authority when he made the statement. It was made before the transaction was completed and was not merely his opinion as to the
cause or effect of the accident. Thus, the facts which must be present if a declaration of an agent is to be admitted as res gestae were present here. The trial
court permitted the statement to be introduced as res gestae, and although the
appellate court did not mention this, it said that the evidence was properly admitted. Certainly this statement was part of the res gestae. Marcus v. Gimbel
Brothers36 is another such case which can be similarly explained. The only case
which the writer found in which a remark of the agent was allowed as evidence
against the principal although he did not have actual authority to make it and
although it did not appear to be res gestae or the consideration for a contract
was Callender v. Kelly.86 In that case the plaintiff had deposited bonds with a
trust company. Later the treasurer of the company told her that the bonds were
still safe and would be given to her any time she wanted them. The statement
was held to be admissible against the trust company. The court said it was
competent, and relevant to the issue, as showing her dealings with the company
in relation to the bonds in controversy. There was no further discussion of the
question. If this case is to be considered as standing for the proposition that a
statement of an agent can be admitted against his principal although nothing
more is shown than that he had apparent authority to make the statement, then
it should not be followed, for it is the only case of this nature and the court has
34157 Pa. 593, 27 Ad. 789 (1893).
3523 Pa. 200, 80 Ad. 75 (1911).
36190 Pa. 455, 42 At. 957 (1899).
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frequently repeated that the agent should have specific authority if his statements
are to be admitted under this part of the rule."
There now remains to be considered the rule that a statement of a general
agent can be admitted against his principal. It seems clear that apparent authority
would be sufficient here. This rule, when it was originally set forth in The Oil
City Fuel and Supply Co. v. Boundy, changed the law as it had previously existed.
in Pennsylvania. In a case decided a few years before the court held that the
statement of the superintendent of a railroad company, who had entire control
and management of the road, could not be admitted against the company.3 8
There is no difficulty in understanding how the requirements of the present rule
are met. The only possible problem is what constitutes a general agent for the
purpose of this rule. However, this should not cause much difficulty as the rule
itself establishes the test, and it seems to be the same as the one which is applied
in the substantive law of agency. In connection with the rule it is said that the
agent's "powers must have been such as to constitute him the general representative of the principal having the management of the entire business."8' 9 In the
law of agency "a general agent is one who is authorized to do all acts connected
with a particular trade, business or employment.'" 40 There are no cases under this
rule in which statements have been admitted in evidence as declarations of a
general agent and so none can be cited as a specific example of whom the court
considers to be a general agent for the purpose of this rule, but statements of a
burgess have been excluded as evidence against the borough, 41 as have remarks
42
of a superintendent as evidence against his employer.
To summarize briefly: Declarations of an agent may be introduced into
evidence against his principal if (1) the fact of agency is shown, (2) some
authority to make the statement is proved, (3) it appears that the remark was
made in connection with the agency, and (4) it appears either that the agent
had actual authority to make the satement or that he was a general agent or that
the statement was part of the consideration for a contract or that it was res gestae.
CHARLES H. DAVISON
cited sopra, note 14.
88Huntingdon and Broad Top Mountain R. and C. Co. v. Decker, 82 Pa. 119 (1876).
89
The Oil City Fuel and Supply Co. v. Boundy, 122 Pa. 449 at 460, 15 Atd. 865 (1888).
4
OPatterson v. Van Loon, 186 Pa. 367, 40 All. 495 (1898).
41Knights of Pythias v. Leadbeter, 2 Pa. Super. 461 (1896).
8'See cases

42

Brown v. Kittanning Clay Products Company, 259 Pa. 267, 102 Ad. 948 (1918).

